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WD1308R1 - 2nd Revision
Can poor countries lobby for more US bilateral aid?
Abstract
This article explores if countries can lobby the US government for the allocation of
US bilateral foreign aid. We consider an informational lobby model where lobbying
have two effects. First, a direct effect by informing US policymakers about their
countries’ needs. Second, an indirect effect on policymakers by informing them about
common interests in economic or geopolitical terms. The lobbyist thus influences the
decisions about the allocation of aid resources. We estimate the effect of the recipient
country’s lobbying agents in obtaining foreign aid. The econometric results show that
lobbying positively affects the amount of bilateral aid received.
JEL Classification: F50, O19.
Keywords: Foreign Aid; Lobbying; Interest groups.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Bilateral and multilateral aid is increasingly selective and allocated by donors
on the basis of objective criteria. Three-fourths of aid agencies, including Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Netherlands, have a positive
relationship between their aid allocations and a measure of sound policies and institu-
tions, after controlling for per capita GDP and population (Dollar and Levin, 2006).
The US has established the Millennium Challenge in 2004 where aid is related to
governance indicators. However, constructing a governance indicator is a futile task
and certainly a subjective and political one. In fact, the US Congress have significant
discretionary power to decide which country “deserves” US taxpayer money in the
form of aid. This study explores if recipient countries’ lobbying activities affects the
amount of US bilateral foreign aid.
Even though many other countries engage in substantial bilateral aid, we focus
on the US because this country systematically records data on lobbying activities
by foreign agents through the Foreign Agent Registration Act of 1938 (FARA), and
this data can be used to study the effect of lobbying on attracting foreign aid. Nev-
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ertheless, the results in this paper are also useful to understand other bilateral aid
relations. In the economics literature, there are some studies on the effect of foreign
lobbying on trade using data from FARA (Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins, 2006;
Kee, Olarreaga and Silva, 2007; Gawande, Maloney and Montes-Rojas, 2009). These
studies share the common feature that foreign lobbying is used for trade related pur-
poses. Our study extends this literature beyond trade. The econometric results in
this paper show that lobbying affects the amount of aid received, but the reverse
effect (i.e. whether aid actually increases lobbying) is not statistically significant.
Our results are robust to the inclusion of a rich set of controls, such as other sources
of aid, bilateral trade and corruption and institutional development in the recipient
country.
The amount of literature analyzing the effect of foreign aid on economic growth
and the allocation of foreign aid between donor and recipient countries is staggering.
References to the aid allocation literature can be found in the survey by McGilivray
(2003), the book by Neumeyer (2003) and the data rich analysis by Berthelemy
and Tichit (2004). The following are some salient studies that are also related to
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ours. Alesina and Dollar (2000) find evidence that the direction of foreign aid is
dictated by political and strategic considerations, rather than by the economic needs
or performance of the recipients. Alesina and Weder (2002) analyzes whether corrupt
countries receive more aid. Chong, Gradstein and Calderon (2001) analyze the effect
of foreign aid on inequaity and poverty. Goldsmith (2001) studies if foreign aid
leads to state failure in Africa. Trumbull and Wall (1994) and Claessens, Cassimon
and Van Campenhout (2009) empirically study the allocation of aid among recipient
countries. Another branch of the literature, which is relevant for the study, is the
degree of “US policy influence” in aid allocations. Rigorous empirical analysis of
IMF’s allocation policy, using alignment with the US in UN-assembly voting, started
with Thacker (1999) and Barro and Lee (2005), while Andersen et al. (2006) shows
that the UN-voting behavior also has a bearing on World Bank allocations. The
reverse, i.e. the US use of aid to buy votes, is analyzed by Dreher et al. (2008).
The closest study to ours is Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2000), who argue
that preferences of ethnic groups within the donor country influence the allocation
of foreign aid. In their model lobbyists make political contributions to the political
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party in power, and the amount that they contribute is contingent upon the policy
the government adopts. Contrary to Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2000) study, our
study is the first to estimate the influence of the recipient country’s lobbying agents
in obtaining foreign aid, where the foreign agent could be both the government and
private groups.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses foreign lobbying in the
US. Section 3 presents the data and its sources. Section 4 presents the econometric
results. The last section concludes.
2 FOREIGN LOBBYING IN THE US
The Foreign Agent Registration Act of 1938 (FARA) provides a legal channel for
foreign governments and businesses to lobby the US government and to influence the
US public opinion. The main restriction is that such foreign “principals” must hire
an “agent” based in the US. These agents may contact the US government or engage
in a public relations capacity on behalf of the foreign principal. For simplicity, we
assume that the principal and the agent share a common interest and refer to them
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as a single individual the “lobbyist”. Moreover, we consider the US Congress as the
only US government agency of interest for our purposes of the allocation of bilateral
aid. Through this FARA channel, lobbying by foreign governments and foreign busi-
nesses has become a large and thriving industry. Foreign lobbying is not necessarily
the purview of rich countries, although it is positively correlated with the country’s
GDP per capita. A variety of rich and poor countries participate in lobbying activ-
ities through FARA channels. Moreover, it encompasses a wide range of activities,
including lobbying those connected with the US government, lobbying the media,
and incurring expenditures on promoting trade through advertising (Husted, 1991).
The model of Austen-Smith and Wright (1992, 1994) stylizes lobbying. The main
premise of the model is that interest groups have private information about the
consequences of a legislative decision. Suppose the interest groups are government
and private agencies in countries interested in receiving foreign aid. The “policy”
they care about is the allocation of US aid where the US policymakers are relatively
uninformed. Austen-Smith and Wright predict that interest groups choose to lobby
legislators who are “friends” or whose prior position on issues is closer to that of
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the lobbyists. This implies that foreign principals use FARA agents to push US
policymakers’ priors closer to their own.
The effect of interest groups and lobbyists on government policy has been studied
in many areas. For instance, in a recent application, Facchini, Mayda and Mishra
(2011) find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play
a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration across
sectors in the US. Using the FARA data, Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins (2006)
study the impact of foreign lobbying on US protectionism and in a related vein, Kee,
Olarreaga and Silva (2007) analyze whether South American lobbies succeeded in
lowering US tariff preferences against those countries. In this case, foreign lobby-
ing “buys” reduction in a partner’s protectionism. The rollback of US protection
confers large rents to foreign exporters, and those exporters (via the help of FARA
agents) initiate the lobbying efforts (see also the model in Gawande and Bandhopad-
hyay, 2000). Gawande, Maloney and Montes-Rojas (2009) view foreign lobbying as
informational lobbying with the intention of effectively achieving the goal of trade
promotion in the context of Caribbean tourism. In this case, lobbyists compete on
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behalf of their clients for a large but finite pool of tourists.
The informational lobbying considered here follows the FARA studies where the
US Congress decisions are affected by the common interests between the US and the
foreign country. Lobbying may not have the direct purpose of attracting aid and it
is in fact done by a variety of agents (eg. government agency, industry association,
large private firms, ONGs) for a variety of reasons. However, on aggregate, these
unrelated lobbying activities inform US policymakers about their countries’ needs
(e.g. earthquake, severe drought, civil war, spread of infectious diseases, production
of narcotics, etc.) and about common interests in economic (trade, investment) or
geopolitical terms. This new set of information from the lobbyists influences the
decisions about the allocation of aid resources. Thus, the informational lobbying
model pursued here predicts that, ceteris paribus, the US Congress prefers to allocate
more bilateral aid to the countries from which citizens or associations lobbied them
more. Contrary to Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2000) study, where ethnic groups
within the donor country influence the allocation of foreign aid, we estimate the
influence of the recipient country’s agents in obtaining foreign aid.
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Since many countries simultaneously compete for aid, lobbying may potentially
have two effects: first, it may increase the amount of resources available for foreign
aid for all countries; and second, it may compete with other countries for a larger
portion of a given amount of aid. This paper interest lies in the net effect of lobbying
on attracting aid, which is the result of a potentially non-cooperative game among
recipients. Of theoretical relevance is the question of whether lobbying competition
among them may be used strategically by policymakers being lobbied to capture rents
without benefiting any lobbyist. The ability of the policymaker being lobbied to take
advantage of lobbying competition and corner the rents is well established in the case
of quid pro quo lobbying (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1994), but it is not clear if it
holds in the case of informational lobbying (Gawande et al., 2009). In the Grossman
and Helpman (1994) model the policymaker’s objective function explicitly trades off
public welfare for lobbying dollars, since the policy distortion that lobbies want causes
welfare loss. This sets the stage for cornering rents from lobbying competition since
the policymaker can now economize on the distortions and yet maximize lobbying
rents. In the informational case policymaker’s objective may not contain such a
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trade-off at all. The policymaker loses nothing by using the information-provision
by all lobbyists to update his priors and take the optimal (welfare-maximizing or
poverty-reduction) actions with respect to each of them separately.
3 DATA
We consider two subsamples based on the recipients’ GDP per capita, one for
GDPpc ≤ US$5, 000 (117 countries, 1500 observations) and another for GDPpc ≤
US$10, 000 (141 countries, 1812 observations). Summary statistics of the variables
used in the next section appear in Table 1.
The data set used in the estimation of our empirical model was assembled using
reports that FARA requires the US Attorney General to make available to Congress.
The report collects information about foreign agents operating within the United
States. A foreign agent, in the view of the US Department of Justice, is somebody
who (a) engages in political activities or acts in a public relations capacity for a
foreign principal, (b) solicits or dispenses anything of value within the United States
for a foreign principal, or (c) who represents the interests of a foreign principal before
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any agency or official of the US government. Each entry in the FARA semi-annual
reports contains (i) the name and address of the foreign agent, (ii) the name of the
foreign principal (usually an industry association or a government agency), (iii) the
purpose of the agency, including any US government entities contacted, and (iv)
amount of money paid to the agencies for their services. The results presented in
this paper use data taken from the reports that covered calendar years 1997-2009.
We collect each data entry provided by the US Congress and record the money spend
and the nationality of the foreign agent. Some entries are not specifically associated
to a country but to a region. Examples of those are regional tourism association, such
as the Caribbean Tourism Association. We opted to exclude this observations rather
than imputing the countries that belong to this regions for three reasons. First, the
imputation method (population or GDP or other) is arbitrary. Second, intra-regional
bargaining power is unknown and may vary depending on the nature of the lobby.
Third, US bilateral aid is assigned on a country-basis rather than on a regional-
basis. Our data do not include expenditures spent directly by the foreign principal
on media or advertising but on their agents who, in turn, informationally lobby
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policymakers. While the FARA reports provide information about the money paid
by foreign countries and the industry they represent, they do not provide information
about how that money is used to achieve its objectives in (iii). Therefore, given the
informational lobbying model we use in the last section, we aggregate all lobbying
expenditures by year and country.
The data obtained from the FARA registries is summarized in the Appendix in
Table A1 (only for our sample of GDPpc ≤ US$10, 000, 141 countries). In general
countries that lobbied the most are the largest countries (China, India, Russia, etc.)
and those with the closest economic and geopolitical ties with the US (i.e. Israel,
Mexico, Colombia, Saudi Arabia, together with those that want to change their
image in the US such as Venezuela and Libya). Moreover, lobbying per capita is
higher for countries with geopolitical ties with the US (i.e. Colombia, Saudi Arabia).
Countries that lobby do not necessarily lobby all years, and in general, different
foreign agents from the same country may have entries in different years. In fact,
different agents of the same nationality may lobby for different and even competing
reasons. A few countries in our sample of GDPpc ≤ US$10, 000 have no entries for
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lobbying. Another issue is a country like Tibet which has independent FARA entries,
but it does not have other information used in the regression analysis, and thus it
is excluded from our sample. We impute a value of 1 to make the logarithm equal
to 0 in those cases. Note that the fact that lobbying entries have different purposes
determine that a value of 0 does not correspond to a case of sample selection.
US Foreign Aid is taken from the US Overseas Loans and Grants, U.S. Bureau
of Census International Database. See http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/
fast-facts.html for an overview. This database comprises several programs. Total
US assistance is disaggregated into economic and military assistance. Each compo-
nent, however, may not be exclusive and it seems rather arbitrary. For instance, the
programs “Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related” or “Narcotic
Control” might have an effect both on military capabilities and in poverty reduction.
Moreover, military assistance is closely related to direct expenditures on the country,
such as in Afghanistan, Colombia and Iraq. Thus, we aggregate total aid and we do
not pursue an analysis by type of aid. US aid is given to governmental institutions
and private individuals, such as NGOs. Total US Assistance is summarized in the
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Appendix Table A1 for the sample of countries used in the regression results below,
GDPpc ≤ US$10, 000, 141 countries. As we did for lobbying we impute a value of 1
to make the logarithm equal to 0 in those cases with no aid. However, in our sample
only 57 observations have a value of 0 aid, and this correspond to a few countries for
some years: Bhutan, Fiji, Iran, Lybia, Montenegro and Serbia.
GDP, population, net official development assistance (ODA) and corruption index
are taken from the World Development Indicators. ODA consists of disbursements
of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by
official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC),
by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic devel-
opment and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients.
It includes loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of
discount of 10 percent). US trade variables are obtained from the US Department
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Foreign Trade.
We also consider the Corruption Control, produced by the World Bank and that
measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including
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petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and
private interests. It is coded from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding with
better governance outcomes. This index is selected because it comprises the larger
number of countries (it has values for our sample of 141 countries) and years. It has
a strong correlation with other indexes with less observations, such as Rule of Law
(from the World Bank; it measures the extent to which agents have confidence in
and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence) and
the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) produced by Transparency International
measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption.
US trade variables (bilateral exports and imports) are obtained from the US
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Foreign Trade. Finally, alignment
with the US in UN-assembly voting is taken from the United Nations General Assem-
bly Voting Data mantained by Georgetown University, Department of Government
(http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Voeten/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?studyId=
38311&versionNumber=1&tab=files). We compute the proportion of votes where
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each country coincides with the US on the General Assembly on an annual basis.
Recipient countries’ needs are captured by aggregate data for all distasters, all
countries on an annual basis, estimated damage costs (U$S), from the Emergency
Events Database (http://www.emdat.be/). We transform the data to real terms and
computed the log value (imputing a value of 1 for the nonexistent log of 0). This
variable is now defined as Disaster.
4 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
(a) Econometric models
Our interest lies in evaluating the link between foreign lobbying and foreign aid
for the period 1997-2009. Consider a panel data model of the form
ln(Aidi,t) = βln(Lobbyi,t−1) + γXi,t + µi + δt + ǫi,t, (1)
where i denotes country, t year, Aid foreign aid, Lobby represents the FARA lobbying
variable, X a set of additional control variables, and (µ, δ, ǫ) an error components
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model with country- and time-specific effects. Country fixed-effects are intended
to capture country’s characteristics that cannot be controlled for using available
covariates. Year fixed-effects capture the business cycle in the US and global events
(such as 9/11), which affect the availability of resources and the US government
preferences for their allocation. See Trumbull and Wall (1994), Hansen and Tarp
(2001) and Claessens, Cassimon and Van Campenhout (2009) for a discussion about
the importance of using a fixed-effects specification. All covariates are lagged one
period to account for the fact that aid allocation decisions in the US Congress are
based on past information and that they are expected to have a certain delay. The
preferred specification uses one lag. Alternative specifications where we include two
(or more) lags of all the variables instead of one, that is t − 1 and t − 2, reported
similar results (not reported but available from the Author upon request). For all
variables, the coefficient corresponding to t− 2 is not significant while that of t− 1
is similar to the reduced specification with one lag.
Nominal variables are deflated to constant 2000 US dollars using the US GDP
deflator and are used in logarithm. The proposed specification uses the variables
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in logs and real terms but with no other standardization. Alternative specifications
could use the variables in per capita or in GDP terms. In the baseline model we
include the lagged value of the logarithm of GDP (deflated to constant 2000 US
dollars), ln(GDPi,t−1), and the logarithm of population, ln(POPi,t−1). As a result
β measures the elasticity of the effect on aid of increasing lobbying, conditional
on a given country size, given by the joint consideration of population and GDP.
Comparable results are obtained if we consider the variables in per capita or GDP
terms (not reported but available from the Author upon request).
Although model (1) would determine whether lobbying affects aid, a dynamic
specification is more appropriate for this particular sample. First, aid programs are
likely to show significant persistence. Aid programs usually spread over several years
once they start (in particular for multiannual programs), and similar to investment
models, they may include fixed costs (setting up an agency to administer the funds,
contacting local agents or governments, etc.) before the program starts working. In
our short panel 1997-2009 where yearly data is used this persistence is significant.
Second, a recent application of the effect of FARA lobbying in a related context by
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Gawande et al. (2009) proposes to use a dynamic specification to account for the
fact that lobbying has both a short-run and long-run effect. Therefore, the proposed
dynamic model is
ln(Aidi,t) = αln(Aidi,t−1) + βln(Lobbyi,t−1) + γXi,t + µi + δt + ǫi,t. (2)
The long-run effect of Lobby on Aid is β
1−α
.
In dynamic panel data models with unobserved effects, the treatment of the
initial observations is an important theoretical and practical problem. As is well
known, the usual within estimator is inconsistent, and can be badly biased. We thus
follow the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and Arellano and Bond (1991) strategy by
taking first order differences and using lagged values of the dependent variable and
other covariates in levels to instrument the autoregressive dependent variable. These
instruments are also valid for other potential endogenous variables. Thus we also
use instruments for the lobbying variable while we consider that all other covariates
(population, GDP, year dummies) are exogenous. In particular, we implement the
Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator that incorporates information
from the levels regression instrumented with lagged differences and has better bias
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properties. The validity of this econometric method depends on the suitability of the
instruments. We report Hansen tests for over identification restrictions and Arellano
and Bond (1991) test AR(2) for second order serial correlation of the residuals. In
all cases, the tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of validity of the Blundell and
Bond (1998) instrumental variables strategy.
The System GMM estimator may suffer however from instrument proliferation
when all possible instruments are used in the GMM. This leads to the non-rejection
of the overidentification tests (Hansen test is weak as the number of instrument in-
creases, see Bowsher, 2002). A proposed solution in the literature is to reduce the
number of instruments by reducing the number of lags, or by collapsing some of
the instruments (see Roodman, 2009). We follow this strategy and report Roodman
(2009, pp.148-149) collapsed instruments System GMM estimator (this is imple-
mented by the option collapse in STATA), and we produce a separate table where
different System GMM estimators are compared in order to check the robustness of
the results. In particular, the System GMM estimator where only the first available
lag is used (i.e. for the lag difference of the dependent and endogenous variables,
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the lag 2, i.e. t − 2, is used as an instrument) and not additional instruments are
constructed, and the full Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator with the maximum
number of instruments. In each case I report the number of instruments constructed
by the GMM estimator.
(b) Results
Table 2 studies the effect of FARA lobbying on Total US Assistance for GDPpc ≤
US$5, 000 and GDPpc ≤ US$10, 000 for the simplest baseline model. For both sub-
samples, the FE static estimation in columns (1) and (4) show a positive and statis-
tically significant effect of FARA. These estimates suggest that increasing lobbying
activities by 1% increases aid on average by 0.03%. The dynamic panel data specifi-
cation shows that aid disbursements are persistent with an autoregressive coefficient
of 0.463 and 0.509 for for GDPpc ≤ US$5, 000 and GDPpc ≤ US$10, 000, respec-
tively. In these cases columns (2) and (5) show that the short run effect of lobbying
reduces to about 0.02 in both specifications (with a significane level of about 10%) but
the long-run effect corresponds to 0.036 (=0.0307/(1-0.463)) and 0.044 (=0.0217/(1-
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0.5090) for GDPpc ≤ US$5, 000 and GDPpc ≤ US$10, 000, respectively. However,
note that this estimates are potentially biased and therefore, as discussed above,
the preferred specification is the System GMM estimator of collapsed instruments
of Roodman (2009), columns (3) and (6). This estimator produces larger short run
effects of 0.0408 and 0.0439 and long run effects of 0.0689 (=0.0408/(1-0.408)) and
0.754 (=0.0439/(1-0.417)) for GDPpc ≤ US$5, 000 and GDPpc ≤ US$10, 000, re-
spectively. Thus increasing lobbying expenditures by 1% increases aid receipts in
the long run by 0.07%. ln(GDPi,t−1) has a negative effect on ln(Aid) which de-
termines that poorer countries receive more aid. Moreover, ln(POPi,t−1) has the
expected positive sign. The Arellano-Bond AR(2) and the Hansen tests show that
the instrumentation strategy is valid.
In order to check the robustness of the GMM estimator we compare it with other
System GMM estimators. Table 3 computes the estimates in Table 2 together with
other alternative instrumentation strategies discussed above. The Roodman (2009)
estimator appears in column Collapsed; the System GMM specification where only
the first lag is used in the GMM instruments is denoted by the column labelled 1
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lag, and the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator with all possible instruments ap-
pears in columns Full. The Collapsed method has the lowest number of instruments
generated by the GMM method, while the full Blundell and Bond (1998) System
GMM estimator has the highest. In all cases the short run effect of lobbying and the
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable are positive and statistically significant.
The Collapsed method has the lowest number of instruments generated by the GMM
strategy, the Full the highest number, and the 1 lag is in between. The Hansen tests
cannot reject the validity of the generated instruments. Overall this suggests that
there is an unequivocal positive effect of lobbying on aid, and the GMM strategy in
Roodman (2009)-Collapsed is valid. This is our preferred estimator.
A potential problem of our estimates is endogeneity in lobbying. Although lobby-
ing is lagged one period and it is treated as endogenous in the Blundell-Bond estima-
tor (and thus lagged values of itself are used as instrumental variables), there may still
be a potential strategic effect of lobbying that relates to future aid. Unfortunately,
there are no suitable instrumental variables that work for our case. Other studies
that used FARA lobbying and develop instrumental variables to control for potential
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endogeneity exploit inter-industry variation in lobbying activities (Gawande, Kr-
ishna and Robbins, 2006; Kee, Olarreaga and Silva, 2007; Gawande, Maloney and
Montes-Rojas, 2009) or factor shares and political economy variables (Gawande and
Bandhopadhyay, 2000). The former, when aggregated at the country level, is not
statistically significant in the first stage, reflecting weak instruments. The latter
cannot be justified for our particular case of foreign aid. Thus, in order to check
for the validity of our estimates, we use a Granger-causality-type analysis, where we
consider the reverse specification, that is we evaluate whether aid has a significant
effect on lobbying. This method, however, tests for a weaker type of causality than
IV methods.
Table 4 studies the reverse effect of Total US Assistance on FARA lobbying, that
is, ln(Lobbyi,t) = αln(Lobbyi,t−1) + βln(Aidi,t−1) + γXi,t + µi + δt + ǫi,t. The idea is
that if lobbying activities are caused by aid, past aid should be a predictor of future
lobbying activities. Foreign aid has been shown to increase goverment spending and
to reduce revenue generation (see Remmer, 2004), and thus aid could affect lobbying
spending. In this case the effect of US assistance is in general positive but not
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statistically significant. Therefore, we can rule out a double causation mechanism
where aid incentivises recipient countries to lobby more or aid money is used for
lobbying activities. The results also confirm that conditional on population size
richer countries lobby more.
(c) Robustness checks
Several robustness checks are carried out. We consider different specifications
where additional covariates that has been found to be significant causes of aid in
the literature are included in the model. These additional covariates thus control
for potential biases arising because of omitted variables, that is variables that affect
both aid and lobbying, and that may be producing the effects in Table 2. The table
reports only the preferred GMM specification. The results appear in Table 5.
In our model of informational lobbying, both aid and lobbying reflect common
interests between the US and the recipient country. We thus include additional
controls that capture this common interest. First, Dreher et al. (2008) argue that
US aid buys voting compliance in the UN General Assembly (see also Wang, 1999).
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Then we include the average annual agreement of the recipient country and the US
(agreeUSAi,t), and include this variable in the regression analysis. Second, bilateral
trade between the US and the recipient country is also a good measure of common
links as this reflects commercial interest between residents in both countries. On
this, Kee, Olarreaga and Silva (2007) show that lobbying is significantly related to
trade. For this we include
Xi,t−1+Mi,t−1
GDPi,t−1
, where X and M correspond to exports and
imports, respectively, of the recipient country to and from the US. Furthermore,
as suggested by an anonymous referee, lobbying activities could also be related to
attracting foreign aid based on the countries’ needs after natural or other significant
disasters. Thus, controlling for disasters would determine whether lobbying has an
effect on aid not related to the countries’ needs in times of emergency. Columns (1)
and (2) consider the inclusion of the three variables discussed in the last paragraph.
In this case the coefficient of aid is 0.015 for GDPpc ≤ US$5, 000 (not statistically
significant) and 0.020 for GDPpc ≤ US$10, 000 (statistically significant at the 10%
level). This is half the coefficient value estimated in Table 2. Then, lobbying is
related to common interest and needs-based foreign aid (the coefficient is reduced
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compared to the baseline regression coefficients), but controlling for needs-based aid
does not eliminate the effect of foreign aid. agreeUSA is positive in both cases and
statistically significant in the first sub-sample only. Trade is significant in both cases,
reflecting the fact that bilateral aid flows towards countries with large commercial
ties with the US. The constructed variable reflecting disasters is positive in both
cases, although not statistically significant.
As discussed above, lobbying-for-aid is a potential non-cooperative game. In
Table 5, columns (3)-(4), we also consider an alternative specification where we add
the lagged logarithm of net official development assistance (ODA), ln(ODAi,t−1), in
order to control for assistance from other sources other than bilateral US assistance.
Moreover we include the amount of lobbying simulataneously made by other countries
(ln(OthersLobby), constructed in the same way as the variable ln(Lobby)). Both
variables are included to control for general equilibrium effects. The first controls
for potential substitution and complementarity with aid from other sources (i.e.
multilateral institutions, Europe, Japan, etc.). The second accounts for the fact
that increasing lobbying may induce other countries to increase it as well, with a
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potential zero effect if the total aid available does not change and only the allocation
among recipient countries is modified. Thus, including the latter variable would
provide the effect of lobbying on aid conditional on the amount of lobbying made
by other countries. The inclusion of these variables does not significantly affect the
coefficient estimate of lobbying, which slightly reduces to 0.035 and 0.040, for each
sub-sample respectively. In these regressions both ln(ODA) and ln(OthersLobby)
are not statistically significant.
Finally, we use Corruption Control index as a proxy for “good governance” of
the potential recipient country. As argued in the Introduction, the US established in
2004 new rules to allocate aid on the basis of governance indicators of the recipient
country. Thus, if the allocation of aid follows pre-established rules, and in particular,
if it only depends on the governance indicators of the recipient country, then it cannot
be influenced by foreign lobbying. We use this index as a proxy for the information
available to the US Congress related to the country governance. (Similar results are
obtained by other governance indicators.) The results appear in Table 5, columns
(5)-(6). The econometric results still show that foreign lobbying has a positive and
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significant effect on bilateral US aid. Note that the effect of the index is positive (it
is coded from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding with better governance
outcomes) but it is not statistically significant in both GMM specifications. These
results are in line with Alesina and Weder (2002) as there is no evidence that less (or
more) corrupt governments receive more foreign aid. Those authors stress that “the
United States appears to favor democracies, but seems to pay no attention to quality
of government of receiving countries” (p.1136). (See Wright, 2009, for a theoretical
discussion.)
5 DISCUSSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
There are many gaps in the economics and political science literature regarding
the pattern of foreign aid followed by donors. This paper contributes to this literature
by showing that foreign lobbying in the US has a statistically significant effect for
attracting US foreign bilateral aid, and thus the allocation of aid may not follow
a purely objective criterion. Recipient countries have a channel to influence the
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allocation of resources. This channel is different from Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller
(2000) study, where ethnic groups within the donor country influence the allocation
of foreign aid. This paper extends the effect extends the effect of foreign lobbying
beyond policy of trade (Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins, 2006; Kee, Olarreaga and
Silva, 2007; Gawande, Maloney and Montes-Rojas, 2009), and thus shows that foreign
lobbying can be an effective tool to influence other international policy variables.
Given that aid could be a significant source of funds with respect to the recip-
ient’s country GDP, this determines that the lobbying channel cannot be ignored.
Increasing lobbying by 1% may increase US assistance up to 0.075% in the long run.
The effect of lobbying remains after controlling for a rich set of controls, includ-
ing common interests, recipient country needs for aid, aid from other donors and
governance indicators.
Of theoretical relevance is the question of whether the more countries that partici-
pate in lobbying, competition among them may be used strategically by policymakers
being lobbied to capture rents without benefiting any lobby. While that outcome is
likely with quid pro quo lobbying (Grossman and Helpman, 1994), it remains to be
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demonstrated within the informational lobbying framework used here. Partial results
in this paper shows that the effect of lobbying remains the same after controlling by
other’s countries lobbying amount. Moreover, it shows that the effect of lobbying is
robust to the amount of foreign aid made by other donors. Finally, it shows that
foreign aid does not cause recipient countries to lobby more.
Further research is needed to evaluate the effect of lobbying on a program by
program basis. As argued in this paper, US Foreign Assistance classification of aid
programs into economic and military assistance is difficult to justify and it seems
arbitrary. For instance, focusing on military programs could contribute to under-
standing of the effect of US assistance on military conflicts and related effects on
their neighbors. Moreover, additional research is needed to evaluate if economic and
military assistance are substitutes or complements.
This study is further motivated to shed light on the large literature on the effect
of foreign aid on economic growth. Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004) study shows
that foreign aid positively affects growth in developing countries with good fiscal,
monetary and trade policies, although critics about the robustness of their results are
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numerous (see Easterly, 2003, Easterly, Levine and Roodman, 2004, Roodman, 2007,
Rajan and Subramanian, 2011). In fact, aid has also been argued to be detrimental
to growth (see for instance the examples in Easterly, 2006). However, the endogeneity
of aid is usually the main concern in all the empirical settings. Lobbying is related to
foreign aid, but it is arguably independent of the recipient country economic growth
as long as lobbying expenditures do not posse too much strain on the country’s
finances. Thus, lobbying can be used as an instrumental variable to study the effect
of foreign aid on growth. Unfortunately, our data span is not long enough to produce
meaningful instrumental variables estimates, but it can be used in the future for this
purpose.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln(Aid)(a) 1812 16.58 3.68 0 23.45
ln(Lobby)(a) 1812 7.14 6.52 0 19.48
ln(GDP ) 1812 22.62 2.08 17.85 28.71
ln(POP ) 1812 15.59 2.05 9.80 21.01
agreeUSA 1635 0.154 0.110 0 0.889
(X +M)/GDP 1803 0.125 .169 0 1.493
ln(OthersLobby)(a) 1812 20.02 0.1881 19.64 20.40
Disaster(a) 1812 2.98 5.03 0 18.74
ln(ODA) 1795 18.42 3.85 0 23.94
Corrup 1745 -0.438 0.613 -1.965 1.507
Notes: The statistics correspond to the sample of GDPpc ≤ 10, 000. (a) A value of 0 is
imputed for Aid = 0 and Lobby = 0. The same procedure is applied for the construction
of Disaster.
Table 2: Effect of Lobbying on Total US Assistance
GDPpc ≤ US$ 5, 000 GDPpc ≤ US$ 10, 000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model FE FE Sys.GMM FE FE Sys.GMM
ln(Aidi,t−1) 0.463*** 0.408*** 0.509*** 0.417***
(0.0643) (0.133) (0.0662) (0.130)
ln(Lobbyi,t−1) 0.0307* 0.0194 0.0408* 0.0375* 0.0217* 0.0439**
(0.0164) (0.0121) (0.0243) (0.0211) (0.0126) (0.0211)
ln(GDPi,t−1) -1.228 -0.395 -0.263*** -0.888 -0.153 -0.348***
(0.834) (0.497) (0.0976) (0.619) (0.408) (0.0912)
ln(Popi,t−1) -0.233 0.130 0.695*** 2.453 1.477 0.763***
(2.766) (1.757) (0.160) (2.354) (1.457) (0.174)
Observations 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,812 1,812 1,812
R-squared 0.092 0.294 0.074 0.320
Number of countries 117 117 117 141 141 141
Arellano-Bond AR(2) stat -1.099 -0.755
AR(2) p-value 0.272 0.450
Hansen stat 30.05 31.18
Hansen p-value 0.148 0.118
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. De-
pendent variable ln(Aidi,t). All specifications include year dummies. Sys.GMM is the
Roodman (2009) collapsed instruments System GMM estimator.
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Table 3: Effect of Lobbying on Total US Assistance: different GMM estimators
GDPpc ≤ US$ 5, 000 GDPpc ≤ US$ 10, 000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model Collapsed 1 lag Full Collapsed 1 lag Full
ln(Aidi,t−1) 0.408*** 0.464*** 0.216** 0.417*** 0.437*** 0.220**
(0.133) (0.103) (0.104) (0.130) (0.0952) (0.0930)
ln(Lobbyi,t−1) 0.0408* 0.0614** 0.0646** 0.0439** 0.0666*** 0.0608**
(0.0243) (0.0240) (0.0279) (0.0211) (0.0214) (0.0263)
ln(GDPi,t−1) -0.263*** -0.288*** -0.377*** -0.348*** -0.377*** -0.466***
(0.0976) (0.103) (0.140) (0.0912) (0.0939) (0.119)
ln(Popi,t−1) 0.695*** 0.645*** 0.941*** 0.763*** 0.748*** 1.025***
(0.160) (0.145) (0.173) (0.174) (0.146) (0.159)
Observations 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,812 1,812 1,812
Number of countries 117 117 117 141 141 141
Arellano-Bond AR(2) stat -1.099 -0.984 -1.508 -0.755 -0.690 -1.217
AR(2) p-value 0.272 0.325 0.132 0.450 0.490 0.224
Hansen stat 30.05 55.43 102.1 31.18 52.72 130.7
Hansen p-value 0.148 0.137 1.000 0.118 0.200 0.980
#IV 25 47 168 25 47 168
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. De-
pendent variable ln(Aidi,t). All specifications include year dummies. Collapsed is the
Roodman (2009) collapsed instruments System GMM estimator. 1 lag is the System
GMM estimator where only 1 lag is used in the GMM generation of instruments. Full is
the Blundell and Bond (1998) System GMM estimator with all possible instruments.
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Table 4: Effect of Total US Assistance on Lobbying
GDPpc ≤ US$ 5, 000 GDPpc ≤ US$ 10, 000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model FE FE Sys.GMM FE FE Sys.GMM
ln(Lobbyi,t−1) 0.345*** 0.425*** 0.361*** 0.467***
(0.0347) (0.0730) (0.0308) (0.0652)
ln(Aidi,t−1) 0.0480 0.0165 0.0207 0.0857 0.0457 -0.0399
(0.0465) (0.0336) (0.134) (0.0827) (0.0588) (0.134)
ln(GDPi,t−1) 0.638 0.662 1.426*** 0.776 0.583 1.033***
(1.362) (1.045) (0.314) (1.058) (0.800) (0.236)
ln(Popi,t−1) -1.319 -0.851 -0.584* 1.985 1.386 -0.244
(4.148) (3.052) (0.321) (3.869) (2.820) (0.263)
Observations 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,812 1,812 1,812
R-squared 0.006 0.126 0.007 0.138
Number of countries 117 117 117 141 141 141
Arellano-Bond AR(2) stat 1.604 1.268
AR(2) p-value 0.109 0.205
Hansen stat 34.24 34.99
Hansen p-value 0.0617 0.0521
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All
specifications include year dummies. Sys.GMM is the Roodman (2009) collapsed
instruments System GMM estimator.
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Table 5: Effect of Lobbying on Total US Assistance. Robustness checks
GDPpc ≤ US$ 5,000 10,000 5,000 10,000 5,000 10,000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Aidi,t−1) 0.442*** 0.432*** 0.393*** 0.412*** 0.412*** 0.360***
(0.158) (0.147) (0.138) (0.134) (0.131) (0.133)
ln(Lobbyi,t−1) 0.0147 0.0204* 0.0350* 0.0403* 0.0425* 0.0475**
(0.0123) (0.0119) (0.0276) (0.0213) (0.0257) (0.0226)
ln(GDPi,t−1) -0.381** -0.480*** -0.132 -0.246** -0.281** -0.444***
(0.173) (0.162) (0.115) (0.109) (0.129) (0.162)
ln(Popi,t−1) 0.782*** 0.857*** 0.468*** 0.624*** 0.714*** 0.905***
(0.263) (0.265) (0.149) (0.162) (0.170) (0.230)
agreeUSAi,t−1 5.041* 3.936
(2.638) (2.394)
Xi,t−1+Mi,t−1
GDPi,t−1
1.743** 1.666**
(0.737) (0.739)
Disasteri,t−1 0.0229 0.0308
(0.0494) (0.0333)
ln(ODAi,t−1) 0.227 0.115
(0.143) (0.0845)
ln(OthersLobbyi,t−1) -32.65 -3.939
(28.31) (3.547)
Corrupti,t−1 0.0842 0.278
(0.365) (0.345)
Observations 1,345 1,629 1,487 1,783 1,424 1,702
Number of countries 114 138 117 141 117 140
Arellano-Bond AR(2) stat -0.631 -0.305 -1.165 -0.824 -1.117 -0.947
AR(2) p-value 0.528 0.760 0.244 0.410 0.264 0.344
Hansen stat 28.05 30.97 29.15 33.02 28.50 30.06
Hansen p-value 0.139 0.0742 0.176 0.0807 0.198 0.148
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications
include year dummies. Roodman (2009) collapsed instruments System GMM estimator.
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Table A1: Summary statistics by country, GDPpc ≤ US$10, 000, 141 countries.
Lobbying Aid
Country Totala Rank Mean(/pop) Rank Mean(/GDP)b Rank Totalc Rank Mean(/pop) Rank Mean(/GDP) Rank
AFGHANISTAN 692 49 0.0017 32 0.0053 42 45500 140 115.25 136 0.5961 141
ALBANIA 1196 61 0.0274 83 0.0169 77 925 80 21.33 117 0.0162 94
ALGERIA 1877 72 0.0040 41 0.0019 30 78 25 0.17 3 0.0001 5
ANGOLA 68000 135 0.3034 121 0.3688 128 2380 114 11.24 99 0.0157 92
ARGENTINA 2187 77 0.0042 43 0.0006 22 124 33 0.24 5 0.0000 3
ARMENIA 444 41 0.0103 61 0.0087 57 1950 108 45.23 130 0.0546 128
AZERBAIJAN 5482 98 0.0461 99 0.0348 99 890 78 7.67 83 0.0084 81
BANGLADESH 659 48 0.0003 19 0.0008 23 2480 116 1.21 20 0.0034 54
BELARUS 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 194 40 1.40 22 0.0010 30
BELIZE 8382 105 2.0999 135 0.5674 134 62 22 15.84 110 0.0047 67
BENIN 966 54 0.0094 58 0.0273 92 955 85 8.83 90 0.0255 105
BHUTAN 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 3 1 0.30 7 0.0003 16
BOLIVIA 2119 75 0.0179 76 0.0176 80 3400 122 27.97 122 0.0268 108
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 5368 97 0.1028 114 0.0517 110 2660 117 53.52 133 0.0408 119
BOTSWANA 2516 84 0.1023 113 0.0299 95 851 76 32.11 123 0.0078 80
BRAZIL 11100 109 0.0044 46 0.0012 26 567 59 0.22 4 0.0001 4
BULGARIA 6189 101 0.0565 101 0.0285 93 863 77 7.76 84 0.0044 62
BURKINA FASO 930 53 0.0055 48 0.0239 89 1010 88 4.98 62 0.0198 99
BURUNDI 154 28 0.0017 31 0.0155 74 548 58 5.36 64 0.0488 124
CAMBODIA 1899 73 0.0108 62 0.0388 101 1150 92 6.06 69 0.0167 95
CAMEROON 2272 80 0.0089 57 0.0130 70 199 41 0.81 17 0.0012 34
CAPE VERDE 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 276 49 41.90 128 0.0299 111
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 64 25 0.0012 25 0.0048 39 204 43 3.47 47 0.0152 90
CHAD 48 23 0.0003 20 0.0011 25 978 86 6.69 76 0.0254 104
CHILE 5760 99 0.0274 84 0.0057 44 94 30 0.43 8 0.0001 7
CHINA 73100 136 0.0040 42 0.0031 36 646 64 0.04 1 0.0000 2
COLOMBIA 165000 139 0.2960 120 0.1137 118 12200 137 20.61 116 0.0075 78
COMOROS 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 5 4 0.59 11 0.0016 39
CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) 19200 121 0.3860 122 0.3219 126 105 31 2.33 38 0.0021 46
CONGO (KINSHASA) (ZAIRE) 1156 59 0.0015 28 0.0163 75 1990 109 2.38 40 0.0265 107
COSTA RICA 2471 83 0.0402 94 0.0085 55 89 28 1.49 24 0.0003 15
COTE D’IVOIRE (IVORY COAST) 9389 107 0.0350 89 0.0642 112 647 65 2.41 41 0.0043 61
CROATIA 10400 108 0.1656 119 0.0345 98 599 60 9.61 92 0.0019 44
CUBA 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 171 38 1.09 18 0.0003 12
CZECH REPUBLIC 6427 102 0.0445 97 0.0068 49 288 51 2.00 30 0.0003 13
DJIBOUTI 427 40 0.0382 92 0.0486 109 201 42 17.96 113 0.0224 100
DOMINICA 2132 76 2.0798 134 0.4794 133 5 3 4.56 60 0.0012 33
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 4048 90 0.0304 86 0.0098 64 812 73 6.24 71 0.0021 47
ECUADOR 2569 86 0.0139 72 0.0086 56 1150 91 6.41 73 0.0044 63
EGYPT 13900 118 0.0134 70 0.0088 58 42300 139 41.78 127 0.0290 109
EL SALVADOR 8430 106 0.1005 112 0.0437 106 2050 112 24.26 119 0.0102 82
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 13000 116 1.5075 132 0.2689 125 6 6 0.75 13 0.0004 17
ERITREA 1540 66 0.0251 82 0.1548 121 789 71 13.99 106 0.0797 135
ESTONIA 586 44 0.0310 87 0.0058 45 165 36 8.65 88 0.0018 43
ETHIOPIA 37000 126 0.0367 91 0.2652 124 7610 133 7.38 80 0.0496 125
FIJI 29 20 0.0026 36 0.0012 27 19 13 1.60 27 0.0007 26
GABON 7070 104 0.4029 123 0.0956 115 47 19 2.63 42 0.0006 25
GAMBIA 328 36 0.0158 73 0.0475 108 80 27 4.06 53 0.0122 84
GEORGIA 4519 93 0.0741 107 0.0679 114 2940 119 46.85 131 0.0522 126
GHANA 3167 87 0.0101 59 0.0330 96 2140 113 7.11 79 0.0247 103
(continued on next page)
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Table A1 (cont.): Summary statistics by country, GDPpc ≤ US$10, 000, 141 countries.
Lobbying Aid
Country Totala Rank Mean(/pop) Rank Mean(/GDP)b Rank Totalc Rank Mean(/pop) Rank Mean(/GDP) Rank
GRENADA 3828 88 2.6806 138 0.6536 136 9 10 6.64 74 0.0016 41
GUATEMALA 2202 78 0.0135 71 0.0078 54 1830 106 10.87 97 0.0062 72
GUINEA 270 31 0.0024 35 0.0065 47 825 74 6.75 77 0.0177 96
GUINEA-BISSAU 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 80 26 4.17 54 0.0259 106
GUYANA 413 39 0.0388 93 0.0436 105 380 55 35.64 125 0.0361 117
HAITI 12100 112 0.0979 111 0.2414 123 3240 121 25.13 120 0.0633 133
HONDURAS 4248 91 0.0437 96 0.0334 97 1420 98 15.27 109 0.0124 86
HUNGARY 271 33 0.0019 34 0.0003 20 319 52 2.24 36 0.0005 18
INDIA 59200 133 0.0039 40 0.0073 50 3560 125 0.24 6 0.0005 20
INDONESIA 16100 119 0.0055 47 0.0061 46 4020 129 1.34 21 0.0015 38
IRAN 474 42 0.0005 23 0.0003 19 37 18 0.04 2 0.0000 1
IRAQ 54400 131 0.1300 116 0.1979 122 73800 141 181.78 138 0.2938 137
JAMAICA 84700 137 2.3190 137 0.6499 135 622 62 16.99 112 0.0047 66
JORDAN 3828 89 0.0504 100 0.0235 88 11200 136 153.62 137 0.0771 134
KAZAKHSTAN 12200 113 0.0575 102 0.0395 102 1360 97 6.36 72 0.0039 59
KENYA 1577 68 0.0031 37 0.0073 51 5010 132 9.81 94 0.0226 101
KIRIBATI 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 15 12 11.71 101 0.0146 89
KOSOVA 900 52 0.0362 90 0.0242 90 1440 101 58.93 134 0.0550 129
KYRGYSTAN 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 953 84 13.57 105 0.0453 121
LAOS 35 22 0.0004 22 0.0011 24 122 32 1.55 25 0.0044 64
LATVIA 368 37 0.0112 66 0.0029 34 180 39 5.51 65 0.0014 37
LEBANON 613 46 0.0110 64 0.0023 31 1510 102 26.51 121 0.0050 69
LESOTHO 1681 70 0.0590 103 0.1295 120 643 63 22.54 118 0.0487 123
LIBERIA 259000 140 5.5485 140 39.2104 141 2380 115 52.50 132 0.4060 140
LIBYA 11800 111 0.1340 118 0.0176 79 66 23 0.76 15 0.0001 9
LITHUANIA 538 43 0.0110 65 0.0031 35 213 44 4.34 55 0.0012 35
MACEDONIA 2388 81 0.0838 109 0.0427 104 932 81 32.93 124 0.0184 97
MADAGASCAR 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 936 82 3.93 51 0.0157 91
MALAWI 204 29 0.0012 26 0.0092 61 1230 95 6.69 75 0.0462 122
MALAYSIA 39300 128 0.1106 115 0.0245 91 167 37 0.45 9 0.0001 8
MALDIVES 77 26 0.0193 79 0.0075 52 8 7 2.04 31 0.0008 27
MALI 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 1710 104 10.38 96 0.0389 118
MARSHALL ISLANDS 55200 132 70.4244 141 32.0283 140 601 61 779.02 140 0.3583 138
MAURITANIA 1139 58 0.0290 85 0.0673 113 224 45 5.51 66 0.0125 87
MAURITIUS 608 45 0.0347 88 0.0077 53 35 17 2.16 34 0.0006 23
MEXICO 137000 138 0.0972 110 0.0164 76 2040 110 1.42 23 0.0002 11
MICRONESIA 2053 74 1.3567 131 0.6576 137 1260 96 830.21 141 0.4041 139
MOLDOVA 8 18 0.0001 18 0.0005 21 674 66 12.16 102 0.0322 112
MONGOLIA 55 24 0.0015 29 0.0028 33 706 68 19.73 115 0.0326 113
MONTENEGRO 5303 96 0.5930 127 0.3705 129 50 21 5.78 68 0.0029 50
MOROCCO 26800 124 0.0620 104 0.0382 100 1740 105 4.04 52 0.0025 49
MOZAMBIQUE 1105 56 0.0043 45 0.0181 82 3570 126 12.40 104 0.0421 120
NAMIBIA 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 1170 93 40.39 126 0.0159 93
NEPAL 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 1040 89 2.80 43 0.0119 83
NICARAGUA 1392 62 0.0181 77 0.0215 85 1440 100 19.33 114 0.0240 102
NIGER 315 35 0.0019 33 0.0111 66 385 56 2.11 33 0.0123 85
NIGERIA 11600 110 0.0059 51 0.0136 71 3110 120 1.55 26 0.0035 55
PAKISTAN 12900 115 0.0059 50 0.0098 63 9850 135 4.48 58 0.0074 77
PALAU 770 50 2.7059 139 0.4322 131 141 35 516.53 139 0.0841 136
PALESTINE 37500 127 0.8556 129 0.8304 138 4450 131 88.74 135 0.0533 127
(continued on next page)
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Table A1 (cont.): Summary statistics by country, GDPpc ≤ US$10, 000, 141 countries.
Lobbying Aid
Country Totala Rank Mean(/pop) Rank Mean(/GDP)b Rank Totalc Rank Mean(/pop) Rank Mean(/GDP) Rank
PANAMA 22400 123 0.5042 126 0.1148 119 379 54 8.62 87 0.0020 45
PARAGUAY 271 32 0.0038 38 0.0026 32 370 53 4.56 59 0.0033 53
PERU 4503 92 0.0117 67 0.0048 41 4210 130 11.25 100 0.0051 70
PHILIPPINES 20100 122 0.0176 74 0.0170 78 2740 118 2.36 39 0.0022 48
POLAND 708000 141 1.3077 130 0.3248 127 1180 94 2.19 35 0.0005 19
ROMANIA 6179 100 0.0203 80 0.0094 62 947 83 3.07 44 0.0016 40
RUSSIA 35700 125 0.0179 75 0.0066 48 17700 138 8.76 89 0.0041 60
RWANDA 1611 69 0.0126 69 0.0464 107 1580 103 14.07 107 0.0567 130
SAMOA 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 23 15 9.27 91 0.0060 71
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 10 11 4.67 61 0.0076 79
SENEGAL 1127 57 0.0075 56 0.0153 72 1070 90 6.98 78 0.0140 88
SERBIA 13600 117 0.1317 117 0.1107 117 458 57 4.43 56 0.0038 58
SEYCHELLES 86 27 0.0793 108 0.0115 67 9 9 7.57 82 0.0010 31
SIERRA LEONE 226 30 0.0039 39 0.0227 87 711 69 11.22 98 0.0588 131
SLOVAKIA 773 51 0.0103 60 0.0017 29 237 47 3.14 46 0.0006 22
SOUTH AFRICA 43700 130 0.0663 105 0.0194 83 3740 127 5.71 67 0.0017 42
SRI LANKA 1555 67 0.0055 49 0.0048 40 849 75 3.11 45 0.0032 52
ST. KITTS & NEVIS 274 34 0.4393 125 0.0603 111 5 5 8.50 86 0.0011 32
ST. LUCIA 4572 94 2.0518 133 0.4492 132 9 8 3.79 50 0.0008 29
ST. VINCENT AND THE GREN. 656 47 0.4302 124 0.1098 116 3 2 1.99 29 0.0006 24
SUDAN 2234 79 0.0043 44 0.0109 65 9160 134 16.51 111 0.0358 116
SURINAME 4680 95 0.7204 128 0.4033 130 49 20 7.49 81 0.0037 57
SWAZILAND 375 38 0.0247 81 0.0180 81 72 24 4.47 57 0.0030 51
TAJIKISTAN 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 920 79 10.31 95 0.0615 132
TANZANIA 1013 55 0.0017 30 0.0045 38 3480 124 6.18 70 0.0187 98
THAILAND 61900 134 0.0678 106 0.0296 94 693 67 0.76 14 0.0003 14
TOGO 28 19 0.0004 21 0.0015 28 91 29 1.18 19 0.0046 65
TONGA 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 21 14 14.58 108 0.0073 76
TUNISIA 1453 63 0.0109 63 0.0055 43 230 46 1.69 28 0.0008 28
TURKEY 39400 129 0.0402 95 0.0092 60 1870 107 2.04 32 0.0005 21
TURKMENISTAN 0 9 0.0000 9 0.0000 9 243 48 3.75 49 0.0048 68
UGANDA 2520 85 0.0062 53 0.0203 84 3900 128 9.78 93 0.0327 114
UKRAINE 12500 114 0.0187 78 0.0222 86 3430 123 5.04 63 0.0069 74
URUGUAY 32 21 0.0007 24 0.0001 18 26 16 0.57 10 0.0001 6
UZBEKISTAN 2435 82 0.0069 55 0.0119 68 800 72 2.25 37 0.0037 56
VANUATU 6492 103 2.2278 136 1.5256 139 130 34 42.02 129 0.0292 110
VENEZUELA 16200 120 0.0456 98 0.0091 59 277 50 0.79 16 0.0002 10
VIETNAM 1514 65 0.0014 27 0.0034 37 773 70 0.67 12 0.0013 36
YEMEN 1498 64 0.0062 52 0.0121 69 992 87 3.51 48 0.0065 73
ZAMBIA 1738 71 0.0125 68 0.0404 103 2040 111 12.34 103 0.0347 115
ZIMBABWE 1188 60 0.0068 54 0.0153 73 1420 99 8.16 85 0.0070 75
Notes: (a) /1000; (b)×1000; (c) /1000000.
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